Defense System Security Leads - Arctic Radar Overlap Risks

The Canadian government does not know when its northern radars will be finished. Every year the replacement slips buys an adversary something: • Another year of the North Warning System holding the mission. Fielded in the late 1980s, running on a trust architecture that predates modern cybersecurity. • Another year of legacy and replacement operating side by side, accumulating integration points, temporary configurations and migration tooling that was never hardened. • Another year of surged contractor, integrator and subcontractor access, during exactly the period when nobody can say what normal traffic looks like. • Another year in which the security baseline of the system being replaced belongs to nobody in particular. An adversary does not need to defeat the new system's security architecture. They need to be present while it is being built, and wait. Full piece below: what the overlap exposes, and why a sensor that keeps reporting while lying is a worse outcome than one that goes dark. If you have worked a major system transition, defence or otherwise, I want to hear from you: who actually owned security during the overlap? I could not find a clean answer anywhere, and I suspect that is the point. #NORAD #ArcticSecurity #DefenseTech