Expert Source on SMR Regulatory Barriers in European Nuclear

SMRs have no future in Europe. That's what the regulatory reality suggests, even if nobody wants to say it out loud. The SMR business model rests on one thing: standardization. One design, deployed in series, replicated country by country. That's what makes it competitive. That's its entire value proposition. And that's exactly what the European regulatory landscape is quietly destroying. The problem: "ASME III" is being misread as a code. It's not. It's a system. The SMRs arriving on the European market Westinghouse, GE Hitachi, Nuscale are natively designed under the ASME BPVC Section III. But when European stakeholders talk about "adopting ASME III", they hear a construction code. One more standard to integrate. That's a fundamental misreading. ASME III is not an isolated technical reference. It's a complete, self-contained certification system, integrated into 10 CFR 50, backed by the NRC as the nuclear safety authority. Owners define the technical requirements. Manufacturers obtain their Certificates of Authorization (N-Types). Authorized Inspection Agencies (AIAs) surveil manufacturing until the Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) signs the Data Reports. Everyone knows their role. It works because it's closed and controlled. Importing the name without importing the system is like taking the engine without the transmission. In Europe, we don't have that. Some member states have a structured safety authority with an established regulatory framework. Others are considering nuclear projects without one. No harmonized regulation on construction codes and conformity assessment exists across the continent. The result is mechanical: every SMR deployment in a European country will have to recreate its own regulatory layer to reconcile the selected construction code with the national framework. Project by project. Country by country. You turn an industrializable product into an individual project every single time. You destroy the value proposition at its foundation. But this isn't inevitable. European safety authorities don't need to agree on which model is best that's a job for lobbyists. One approach could be to work on mutual recognition agreements. Any clear position unblocks every project that follows. It's the absence of a position that is costing us. That's where the energy should go not on technology, not on financing. On regulatory clarity. That's the real issue. For those working on these topics: are you seeing any authorities starting to take a formal position? Any precedents emerging on your projects? FR in the comments section below